





Working Paper No. 374 
 
 
Non-US global banks and dollar (co-)dependence: 


















University of Zurich 
 




Working Paper Series 
  
ISSN 1664-7041 (print) 













Non-US global banks and dollar (co-)dependence:
how housing markets became internationally synchronized
Torsten Ehlers Mathias Hoffmann Alexander Raabe*
Abstract
US net capital inflows drive the international synchronization of house price growth. An
increase (decrease) in US net capital inflows improves (tightens) US dollar funding conditions for
non-US global banks, leading them to increase (decrease) foreign lending to third-party borrowing
countries. This induces a synchronization of lending across borrowing countries, which translates
into an international synchronization of mortgage credit growth and, ultimately, house price
growth. Importantly, this synchronization is driven by non-US global banks’ common but het-
erogenous exposure to US dollar funding conditions, not by the common exposure of borrowing
countries to non-US global banks. Our results identify a novel channel of international transmis-
sion ofUS dollar funding conditions: As these conditions vary over time, borrowing country pairs
whose non-US global creditor banks are more dependent on US dollar funding exhibit higher
house price synchronization.
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House prices co-move considerably across country pairs and time, as shown in Figure (1).
Measured as the pairwise product of the four quarter ahead country-level house price growth in the
period 1970 to 2015, international house price synchronization reached significant peaks in 1971-
73, 1986-88 and in the 2000s in the run-up to the Global Financial Crisis. Over the same period,
the dispersion of house price synchronization across country pairs measured by the interquartile
range varies significantly. In most countries, housing wealth represents the largest component of net
household wealth and it is the single most important collateralizable asset. Identifying the drivers of
the international synchronization of house prices is therefore paramount for understanding macro-
financial linkages at the global level.
This paper highlights a new international spillover channel through which variations in US
dollar funding conditions affect the international synchronization of house prices. Specifically, fol-
lowing Hoffmann and Stewen (2020), we argue that net capital flows into the US represent a positive
refinancing shock to the US financial system, leading to improved funding conditions of US banks. In
their ability to explain the dynamics of non-US global lending and the international synchronization
of house prices, we find that US net capital inflows dominate other price-based indicators of US dollar
funding conditions proposed in the literature. The improvement in refinancing conditions coming
from amore ample supply of US dollars not only benefits banks domiciled in the US, but also non-US
banks seeking to raise funding from the US financial system, and thus funding denominated in US
dollars. Non-US banks significantly depend on funding in US dollars to finance the issuance of US
dollar-denominated loans. Figure (2) reveals that their share of liabilities denominated in US dollars
stands at 45 percent on average. This dollar dependence is what makes non-US banks susceptible to
variations in US dollar funding conditions induced by US net capital inflows. An increase in US net
capital inflows loosens non-US banks’ leverage constraints and enables them to providemore credit to
counterparty banks in various foreign borrowing countries, consistent with the double-decker struc-
ture of the global banking system first emphasized by Bruno and Shin (2014) and also highlighted in
Hale and Obstfeld (2016). These counterparty banks absorb the foreign credit, and channel the ad-
ditional funds obtained from abroad into domestic mortgage credit, resulting in upward pressure on
house prices. As this pattern replicates itself across borrowing countries, house prices become inter-
nationally synchronized. Accordingly, a decrease in US net capital inflows also results in higher house
price synchronization.
This mechanism entails that the synchronization of house prices between two arbitrary bor-
rowing countries hinges on the extent to which their respective non-US global creditor banks on av-
erage depend onUS dollar funding. This is what we call dollar co-dependence. Hence, themechanism
goes beyond the role of common lenders and focuses on the exposure of global lenders — common
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or otherwise — to global US dollar funding conditions. We show that dollar co-dependence is a key
driver of house price synchronization over time and across countries.
To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to explore empirically how the topography of the
global banking network affects the synchronization of real outcomes, and in particular of real estate
markets. A key feature of the global banking network is that banks headquartered in a few advanced
non-US economies, notably Germany, France, the UK, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Japan, ac-
count for the bulk of global international credit as well as for the largest-sized bilateral lending flows
between countries (Aldasoro and Ehlers (2019)). Our empirical analysis documents that these non-US
global banks play the biggest role in facilitating the international spillover of US net capital inflows
to real estate markets worldwide.
To identify the mechanism, we develop a statistical model that relates US dollar funding con-
ditions and the dollar dependence of non-US banks to the international synchronization of house
prices. The model allows us to derive an empirically testable relationship between the pairwise in-
ternational house price synchronization and borrowing countries’ dollar co-dependence. The dollar
co-dependence reflects borrowing countries’ pairwise indirect exposure to fluctuations in US dol-
lar funding conditions through their respective non-US global creditor banks. Higher dollar co-
dependence implies that two borrowing countries jointly rely on creditors that are more dependent
on dollar funding.
The construction of the dollar co-dependence is one of our key conceptual contributions.
We construct this novel measure by combining granular data from the BIS consolidated (CBS) and
locational international banking statistics (LBS). More formally, the dollar co-dependence captures a
combination of non-US global banks’ dollar dependence and borrowing countries’ heterogeneous ex-
posure to their respective non-US global creditor banks. Our empirical counterpart of non-US banks’
dollar dependence is the fraction of global US dollar-denominated foreign bank borrowing that non-
US global banks account for. As we show, this measure differs considerably across non-US banks and
thus captures their heterogeneous response to shifts in US dollar funding. The computation of the
fraction is based on the BIS locational banking statistics by nationality (LBSN), which provides infor-
mation about the currency composition of the cross-border positions of banks’ foreign offices. We
aggregate the positions booked in each location to assess non-US banks’ US dollar positions, subtract
interoffice positions denominated in US dollars, and add the local positions in US dollars of non-US
banks vis-à-vis the United States from the CBS. A borrowing country’s exposure to a non-US global
creditor bank is given by the share of that non-US bank in the borrowing country’s market for foreign
credit provision. Equipped with these market shares and non-US banks’ dollar dependence, for each
pair of borrowing countries i and j, we derive the dollar co-dependence as the pairwise product of the
weighted average of the respective non-US global creditor banks’ dollar dependence. The weighting
is determined by the market shares of non-US global creditor banks in each borrowing country. We
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show empirically that the dollar co-dependence is a key driver of house price synchronization over
time and across countries.
Our model is based on the theoretical framework by Landier et al. (2017), which we adapt
and extend to the international context. They document that the banking liberalization in the United
Stateswhich took place between 1970 and themid-1990s increased the synchronization of house price
movement across states. The banking liberalization led to the rise of large banks with high market
shares in many states. That is, a common exposure of states to the same creditor banks emerged.
Landier et al. (2017) show that, for a given pair of US states, house price synchronization is a function
of this common exposure to the same creditor banks. Thus, house prices across states became more
exposed to idiosyncratic shocks to the same banks and, as a result, more synchronized.
We extend their framework to an international context. That is, instead of focusing on in-
dividual banks, our adaptation focuses on entire banking systems, i.e. the country level aggregate of
banks providing and receiving foreign credit. Data from the CBS available from the Bank for In-
ternational Settlements (BIS) allow us to construct bilateral country-level exposures of a borrowing
country’s banking system to the banks headquartered in the countries providing foreign credit, hence-
forth called lending banking systems. Coupled with an empirical measure of non-US global banks’ dol-
lar dependence obtained from the BIS’s LBSN, we construct an empirical counterpart to the dollar
co-dependence.
Importantly, and differently from Landier et al. (2017), our focus is not on the impact of id-
iosyncratic shocks to common creditor banks, and in our context, common lending banking systems
on synchronization. Rather, we adapt the framework to take into account the differential exposures
of lending banking systems to US dollar funding shocks. In our framework, the synchronization of
house prices between two arbitrary borrowing countries will depend not only on whether they are
exposed to common lending banking systems, as suggested by Landier et al. (2017), but also on their
— common or otherwise — lending banking systems’ dependence on US dollar funding. To see the
gist of our argument, consider two countries A and B, with A borrowing exclusively from lending
banking system C and B from lending banking system D, respectively. Hence, the two countries have
no common lender. Neither country A nor country B directly borrows fromUS headquartered banks.
Idiosyncratic shocks to the lending banking system C affect only country A, and idiosyncratic shocks
to lending banking system D only affect country B. Therefore, uncorrelated lending banking system
specific shocks will not lead to co-movement in the foreign lending supply to A and B. However, if
bothC andDhave correlated funding sources because both ultimately borrow inUS dollars, then fluc-
tuations in US dollar funding conditions will affect both C and D and therefore lead to synchronized
outcomes for countries A and B. Hence, A and B are effectively co-dependent on US dollar funding
although they do not share common lending banking systems.
As we show empirically, it is indeed borrowing countries’ dollar co-dependence rather than
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a common exposure to lending banking systems that qualifies as significant driver of international
house price synchronization. An increase in dollar co-dependence implies that the respective lending
banking systems of two arbitrary borrowing countries becomemore dependent onUS dollar funding,
strengthening the link between shifts in US dollar funding conditions and the international synchro-
nization of house prices. To show this, we test our model empirically by translating it into panel
regressions. The results indicate a positive statistically significant relationship between the dollar co-
dependence and the international synchronization of house prices. In particular, an increase in dollar
co-dependence of the average country pair by 10 percentage points is associated with an increase of
house price synchronization by 38 percent relative to its mean. This result is confirmed when we
explore several intermediate steps in the mechanism outlined above. An important intermediate step
is that the foreign lending supply induced by shifts in US dollar funding conditions affects mortgage
credit growth of banks in borrowing countries. We demonstrate a positive statistically significant re-
lationship between dollar co-dependence and the international synchronization of mortgage credit
growth. Furthermore, we show that the effect of changes in US dollar funding conditions on mort-
gage credit growth and on house price growth is increasing in the dollar dependence of borrowing
countries through the exposure of their non-US global creditor banks to the variations in US dollar
funding. We also find that the effect of US dollar funding conditions on non-US global creditor banks’
foreign lending supply is increasing in their dollar dependence, in particular when foreign lending is
denominated in US dollars and when non-US global banks lend to borrowing countries’ banks as
opposed to non-banks. These results are robust to a battery of robustness checks, including a rich set
of controls and fixed effects.
Our analysis builds on and contributes to several strands of the literature. A first strand com-
prises recent studies on the international synchronization of house price growth. Alter et al. (2018)
and Alter et al. (2018) show that the variation in the cross-country correlation between real estate
markets is associated with global financial conditions inferred from financial condition indices. Our
paper sheds light on the specific mechanism through which US dollar funding conditions affect the
international co-movement of house prices. Alter et al. (2018) and Alter et al. (2018) also show that the
cross-country correlation between real estate markets increased over time. Miles (2017) does not find
evidence in support of a rising international co-movement. Regardless of the trend of co-movement,
these studies highlight the variation both over time and across countries. Both the theoretical and em-
pirical results in this paper show that a considerable part of the time and cross-country variation in
co-movement can be explained by the dollar co-dependence. Other studies on the pairwise interna-
tional co-movement of house prices, notably Milcheva and Zhu (2016), have focused on the bilateral
integration through bank capital flows rather than the triangular relationship between borrowing
country pairs and non-US global banks explored in this paper.
A second strand of literature pertinent to our paper deals with the global financial cycle (Bruno
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and Shin (2015); Boz et al. (2019); Cerutti et al. (2017); Habib and Venditti (2019); Miranda-Agrippino
and Rey (2019); Rey (2015)). This literature has shown that capital flows around the globe are driven
by a dominant common factor that can directly be related to shocks to the balance sheets of globally
active financial intermediaries. Recent research converges on the insight that the role of the dominant
common factor is assigned to the US dollar in terms of its influence on both capital and trade flows
(Avdjiev et al. (2018); Boz et al. (2018, 2017); Bruno and Shin (2019); Gopinath and Stein (2018a,b)).
Avdjiev et al. (2018) argue that the value of the US dollar reflects the international shadow price of
bank leverage. A cheaper US dollar relaxes financing conditions for global banks, directly affecting
credit supply and investment in borrowing countries. Barajas et al. (2019) provide further evidence
that an increase in US dollar funding costs reduces non-US banks’ foreign lending, increasing the
probability of financial stress in borrowing countries. Our focus in this paper is to show how US
dollar funding conditions proliferate through intermediary non-US lending banking systems in the
global banking network rather than directly through internationally active US or ultimate borrowing
country banks, and how this mechanism affects house prices worldwide.
Different from the literature cited above, however, we draw attention to the role of net cap-
ital inflows into the United States as an important driver of US dollar refinancing conditions. Our
analysis builds on Hoffmann and Stewen (2020) who show that capital inflows into the United States
relax the funding conditions of US domestic banks. This contributed to the run-up in house prices
across the United States prior to the recent financial crisis. Our paper extends this logic to non-US
global banks that borrow in US dollars to fund foreign lending. We verify empirically that, in direct
comparison with other price-based indicators of US dollar funding conditions, only US net capital
inflows significantly affect bank lending by non-US banks and house price developments worldwide.
The idea that US aggregate borrowing — which is predominantly denominated in dollars — effec-
tively amounts to a provision of dollar liquidity to the rest of the world has a venerable tradition,
going back to Triffin (1960) and has recently been given a modern interpretation in Krishnamurthy
and Lustig (2019). Given how central dollar liquidity is for the funding conditions of non-US global
banks (Avdjiev et al. (2018)), our results provide a novel perspective on the link between US aggregate
borrowing and international banking flows.
Our focus on net capital inflows is also justified by a large literature that has argued that per-
sistent capital inflows into the US ultimately reflect a savings glut — a global excess demand for safe
assets denominated in US dollars — and that these capital inflows contribute to house price develop-
ments (Aizenman and Jinjarak (2009); Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2018); Favilukis et al. (2012); Ferrero (2015);
Hoffmann and Stewen (2020); Justiniano et al. (2014)). In fact, this literature has documented a strong
link between capital inflows and house prices across countries or US regions. However, all of these
papers focus on how capital inflows affect house prices in the country to which the capital is flowing.
Our analysis here draws attention to how capital inflows into a hegemonic country and provider of
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the world’s dominant currency ripple through the global banking network to affect house prices in
third-party countries that are not the destination of the original capital inflows. Our results provide
evidence in favor of international spillovers from US net capital inflows as an important driver of
house price developments around the world.
Our focus on non-US global banks is motivated by a recent literature which suggests that
the impact of changes in funding conditions in the US dollar funding market is more relevant for
non-US banks than US-domiciled banks, and applies in particular to non-US global banks that face
demand for US dollar-denominated credit. As argued by Ivashina et al. (2015), variations in US dollar
funding conditions affect non-US banks more strongly as they are US dollar funding constrained for
several reasons. First, a lack of a branch network in the United States prevents non-US banks from
issuing insured US dollar-denominated retail deposits. Second, synthetic US dollar borrowing in the
forward market of the home currency of these banking systems has become more expensive since the
Global Financial Crisis due to limited capital to take the other side of a foreign exchange swap trade,
as evidenced by persistent CIP deviations (Borio et al. (2017, 2016)). Third, post-crisis regulatory
reforms further tightened the US dollar funding supply for non-US banks (Du et al. (2018); Iida et al.
(2018); Barajas et al. (2019)). Fourth, central banks other than the US Federal Reserve cannot create
US dollar liquidity to alleviate US dollar funding shortages of non-US global banks headquartered
in their jurisdiction. These central banks’ ability to provide US dollars is limited by the exchange
rate regime or limited by the availability of US dollar reserves (McGuire and von Peter (2012)). For
these reasons non-US global banks are more exposed to fluctuations in wholesale US dollar funding
conditions than are US banks. Empirical studies from the literature on international monetary policy
spillovers underscore the sensitivity of non-US global banks to US dollar funding conditions (Avdjiev
et al. (2018); Buch et al. (2019); Lindner et al. (2018); Schmidt et al. (2018)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section (2) formally introduces the con-
cept of dollar (co-)dependence and provides first empirical evidence that its variation across borrow-
ing countries is fundamental to an explanation of the effect of US dollar funding conditions on house
price growth and house price growth synchronization worldwide. Section (2) also explains the sta-
tistical model used to guide the empirical analysis. Section (3) discusses features of the data relevant
to the empirical application of our model. We present the empirical framework and main findings in




2.1 Dollar (co-)dependence: the concept
To study the effect of variations inUSdollar funding conditions onhouse price growth through
non-US global banks, we introduce the concepts of dollar dependence and dollar co-dependence.
These concepts formalize the indirect exposure of borrowing countries to US dollar funding con-
ditions via their respective lending banking systems’ exposure to US dollar funding conditions. For
each borrowing country i, we define the dollar dependence as the average fraction of global foreign
bank borrowing denominated in US dollars accounted for by banks headquartered in the banking
systems lending to country i at a given point in time. More formally, let ωb,it be the market share that





whereLit are aggregate foreign claims on country i, and can be decomposed into bilateral claims from





where Lb,it measures the bilateral foreign claims of lending banking system b on borrowing country i
andB(i) is the set of lending banking systems providing foreign credit to banks in country i. Further,
let λbt be the fraction of global bank borrowing denominated in US dollars accounted for by banks









where Lb,(USD)t denotes the US dollar-denominated borrowing by lending banking system b. Effec-
tively, λbt represents the market share of lending banking system b in the global market for US dollar-
denominated bank borrowing, notably the US money market. Combining ωb,it and λbt , we define the











t represents each borrowing country i’s weighted average of the dollar dependence λbt of banks
headquartered in the banking systems lending to country i at time t, with the market shares ωb,it
serving as weights.
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Our identification strategy relies on cross-country heterogeneity in DDit. Figure (6) indeed
depicts considerable variation of the time average of the dollar dependence DDit across borrowing
countries i, as the time average of DDit ranges from 3.45 percent for Slovakia to 11.84 percent for
South Africa. Following the definition of DDit, this variation across borrowing countries i is driven by
either the heterogenous exposure of borrowing countries i to lending banking systems b as given by
ωb,it , or the heterogenous exposure of lending banking systems b to variations in US dollar funding as
given by λbt , or by a combination of both. To consider two extreme examples, for any two borrowing
countries i and j sharing exactly the same set of lending banking systems b as common lenders, i.e.




t explains the difference between DDit and
DD
j
t . In contrast, for any two countries i and j borrowing from a completely distinct set of lending
banking systems b1 and b2, heterogeneity in λb1t and λ
b2





accounts for the variation in DDit and DD
j
t . Section (3) provides further empirical insights into the
cross-country heterogeneity of ωb,it ,λbt and DDit.
In the next section, we first show that house prices in countries with high dollar dependence
are particularly exposed to our key measure of US dollar funding conditions, US net capital inflows.
We then propose a statistical model that rationalizes this finding and which allows us to explore
its implications for the synchronization of house price growth across borrowing countries. It is in
this context that the notion of dollar co-dependence will become relevant. We define the dollar co-









As we will show both theoretically and empirically, the synchronization of house price growth in
two arbitrary borrowing countries i and j increases directly in CoDDi,jt . While we provide a detailed
proof and example in the subsequent sections (2.2) and (2.3), the basic intuition is simple: For a pair of
borrowing countries to have a high level of dollar co-dependence the individual dollar dependencies
of both countries need to be relatively high. As we will show in section (2.2), house price growth in a
borrowing country directly increases in a borrowing country’s dollar dependence. Thus, a high dollar
co-dependence means that house price growth in both borrowing countries will co-move strongly in
response to changes in US dollar funding conditions.
Importantly, high levels of dollar co-dependence and thus a high synchronization of house
price growth can occur between borrowing countrieswith exposure to entirely distinct sets of lending
banking systems. All that matters for the role of the dollar co-dependence is that both borrowing
countries are exposed to lending banking systems that are themselves, on average, highly dependent
on US dollar funding.
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2.2 House prices, US capital inflows, and dollar dependence: first evidence
In this section, we provide a first look at the data to illustrate one key point: House prices
around the globe co-move with US net capital inflows and the strength of this co-movement depends
on a country’s dollar dependence.
Our interpretation of this finding builds on earlier work by Hoffmann and Stewen (2020).
These authors demonstrate that US net capital inflows represent a positive refinancing shock to the
US financial system, allowing banks in the US to increase their lending in the US. In this paper, we
extend this logic to argue that an increase in US net capital inflows not only improves refinancing
conditions of US banks, but of any non-US banks procuring funding from the US financial system,
and thus funding denominated in US dollars. Figure (2) exhibits that non-US global banks raise a
significant fraction of their funding in US dollars, with the fraction exceeding 45 percent for most of
our sample period. This is why the bank lending capacity of non-US global banks is susceptible to US
net capital inflows, leading them to adjust the provision of foreign credit, and US dollar-denominated
foreign credit in particular.
Figure (3) depicts the development of US net capital inflows during our sample period, and
shows that there is considerable time variation in US dollar funding conditions. We scale the US net
capital inflows in one of two ways: either by total US commercial bank equity to account for the
risk taking capacity of the US financial system, or by all lending banking systems’ total outstanding
US dollar denominated foreign claims worldwide. The risk taking capacity is an especially relevant
scaling factor, since the level of US commercial bank equity determines the extent to which US banks
are financing constrained, leavingmore room for non-US banks to absorb availableUS dollar funding.
To illustrate the link between house price growth and US capital inflows, for each borrowing






= βiCAPFLOWt + µ





is the growth rate of house prices in borrowing country i over four quarters ahead and
CAPFLOWt denotes US net capital inflows scaled as mentioned above. Akin to an asset pricing-model,
for each borrowing country i, the coefficient βi measures the sensitivity of country-specific house
price changes to the aggregate risk factor, CAPFLOWt. Figure (4) plots the estimates of βi against
each borrowing country i’s dollar dependence DDit. A clear positive relationship emerges between
the sensitivity of borrowing countries’ house price growth to US net capital inflows and countries’
dollar dependence. That is, the effect of US dollar funding conditions— asmeasured byUS net capital
inflows — on house price growth worldwide is increasing in borrowing countries’ indirect exposure
to US dollar funding conditions through the dollar dependence λbt of the lending banking systems
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b providing foreign credit to country i. It is this empirical observation that constitutes our point of
departure into the investigation of how the dollar dependence of non-US global banks constitutes a
concrete link between the variations in US dollar funding conditions and house price growth around
the world.
Figure (5) plots the estimates of βi obtained from time series regressions similar to equation
(6) for potential drivers of US dollar funding conditions other than US net capital inflows. The re-
lationship between the sensitivity of countries’ house price growth to those other alternative drivers
of US dollar funding conditions and countries’ dollar dependence is largely absent or negative. This
lends support to the notion that US net capital inflows are an important independent driver for US
dollar funding conditions that is not easily driven out by other factors that have been suggested in the
literature. Section (4) below further buttresses this point and discusses the alternative drivers of US
dollar funding conditions.
2.3 International house price synchronization: a stylized model
To study the impact of US net capital inflows on the synchronization of housing markets, we
adapt and extend the methodological framework of Landier et al. (2017). They show that an increase
in the co-movement of house prices across US states between the late 1970s and the mid 1990s can
be associated with the emergence of multi-state banks in the wake of the US interstate banking lib-
eralization implemented over the same period. The lynchpin of their framework is a common lender
effect: House prices in US states in which multi-state banks have relatively large market shares ex-
hibit higher co-movement as these states are relatively more exposed to the idiosyncratic shocks of
multi-state banks.
Relative to their setting, we innovate along two dimensions. First, we take their setup to the
international level and analyze the effect on house price co-movement across countries. That is, our
unit of analysis are entire country level banking systems, i.e. the aggregate of all banks headquartered
in a country instead of individual banks. Therefore, our framework is based on bilateral country-level
exposures to banking systems providing foreign credit rather than bilateral US state-level exposures
to individual banks.
Second, and more importantly, we uncover that the international synchronization of house
price growth between borrowing countries crucially depends on their respective lending banking sys-
tems’ heterogenous exposure to refinancing conditions in US dollars, as captured by borrowing coun-
tries’ dollar co-dependence. Importantly, the lending banking systems that two arbitrary borrowing
countries are exposed to do not need to be common lenders. For the effect of US dollar refinancing
conditions on house price growth synchronization to be increasing in borrowing countries’ dollar
co-dependence, it is sufficient to consider borrowing countries’ exposure to their respective lending
banking systems’ dollar dependence λbt — independent of whether these lending banking systems are
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common to both countries in a pair.
In addition to dollar co-dependence, our framework leaves room for a common lender effect
as the theoretical setup allows for borrowing countries’ exposure to idiosyncratic shocks of common
lending banking systems. Empirically, however, section (4) shows that this common lender effect
is dwarfed by borrowing countries’ indirect exposure to US dollar refinancing conditions through
their respective lending banking systems, i.e. our dollar co-dependence. The common lender effect
pales at the international level compared to the dollar co-dependence because of the relatively high
dependence on dollar funding of the largest lending banking systems that account for the bulk of
bank borrowing in US dollars — in particular Germany, France, UK, Switzerland, the Netherlands
and Japan. It is this dependence on US dollar funding that makes foreign lending by particularly these
banking systems susceptible to variations in US dollar funding conditions, and that ultimately makes
borrowing countries’ dollar co-dependence a powerful vector of transmission of US dollar funding
shocks to the international synchronization of house price growth.
Specifically, following Landier et al. (2017), we conjecture that foreign bank credit supply to




in borrowing country i with an elas-









where νit is a shock specific to borrowing country i and captures credit demand.1 Furthermore, for
the foreign lending supply provided by lending banking system b to banks in country i we posit that
∆Lb,it
Lb,it−1





where γt is a global factor that is homogeneous in its impact across borrowing countries and lending
banking systems alike, and where ηbt is an idiosyncratic shock specific to lending banking system b.
Our analysis in this paper focuses on the role of ζt, to which we assign the role of a commonUS dollar
1As housing represents the most important collateralizable financial asset around the world, banks in country i are
likely to channel additional funds borrowed from abroad into mortgage lending. In fact, mortgage lending constitutes
about 90 percent of household lending in the borrowing countries of our sample. The literature on the effect of capital
inflows on house prices provides further evidence for the central role of the domestic banking sector in translating capital
inflows into mortgage credit. Aizenman and Jinjarak (2009) demonstrate that the effect of capital inflows on house prices
is increasing in countries’ financial depth measured as bank credit to GDP. Sá et al. (2014) show that the effect of capital
inflows on house prices in OECD countries correlates positively with the degree of mortgage market development, and
in particular with loan-to-value ratios. The latter points at borrowing country banks’ fundamental role as financial inter-
mediaries in creating a link between capital inflows and house price growth. The study by Hoffmann and Stewen (2020)
also assigns a prominent role to domestic banks in funneling capital inflows into mortgage lending, thus driving house
prices. Indeed, we show in section (4) below that borrowing country banks’ mortgage credit provision is a key vector of
transmission of foreign borrowing to housing markets, and that mortgage credit growth is synchronized in a similar way
as house prices.
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funding shock. Specifically, we argue that this funding shock corresponds to net capital inflows into
the United States, denoted by CAPFLOWt in our empirical specifications. We therefore propose that
ζt = CAPFLOWt. (9)
Importantly, based on the first evidence in subsection (2.2), we argue that theUSdollar funding
shock ζt in (8) loads differentially on lending banking systems, with the loading given byλbt−1,the share
that these lending banking systems have in the global market for US dollar funding at time t− 1. As
we will show, this assumption drives the empirical implications of our theory concerning the impact
of co-dependence on the synchronization of housing markets. Next, we briefly discuss the economic
intuition behind this assumption.
The notion that the variation in US dollar funding supply affects foreign lending by non-US
banks in proportion to their previous shares in the US dollar funding market can be justified by the
presence of various forms of balance sheet constraints, all of which matter in practice. One type of
constraint pertains to maturity mismatches as banks typically refinance long-term assets with short
term liabilities. Thus, a lending banking system’s need for short-termUS dollar funding could be pre-
determined by the amount of longer-term US dollar-denominated claims accumulated in previous
periods.2 Another type of constraint applies to currency mismatches on banks’ balance sheets. This
could be because of regulatory constraints or because synthetic US dollar funding in global banks’
home currency has become costlier after the Global Financial Crisis (Barajas et al. (2019); Ivashina
et al. (2015); Borio et al. (2016)).3 These balance sheet constraints result in non-US lending banking
systems being US dollar funding constrained.4 To the extent that non-US banks fully match their US
dollar lending with US dollar liabilities, fluctuations in US dollar funding conditions should directly
translate into variation in foreign lending in direct proportion to the lending banking system’s share
in the US dollar funding market. This is exactly what our loading λbt−1 captures.
Consolidating equations (7) and (8), we obtain
2Such US dollar-denominated claims result from borrowing countries’ demand for credit denominated in US dollars
as the world’s dominant currency, because borrowing countries seek to benefit from the advantages that the dominant
currency bestows in trade invoicing and international borrowing (Gopinath and Stein (2018a,b); Maggiori et al. (2019)).
3Basel regulations impose regulatory capital charges on unhedged foreign exchange risk, meaning that banks would
find it optimal to avoid foreign exchange mismatches to save scarce capital (Ivashina et al. (2015)). Furthermore, a number
of post-crisis regulatory reforms have increased the cost of non-US global banks’ funding in US dollars (Du et al. (2018)).
An example is the 2016 money market mutual fund reform in the United States, which in a first instance reduced access to
US dollar funding for non-US banks (Aldasoro et al. (2017)). Moreover, the rise of non-banks inUS dollar fundingmarkets
rendered the supply of US dollar funding more procyclical, further tightening the supply of US dollars to non-US global
banks in times of stress (Iida et al. (2018)).
4Beyond these balance sheet constraints, non-US banks are by definitionUSdollar funding constrained because central
banks other than the US Federal Reserve cannot create US dollar liquidity to alleviate US dollar funding shortages. The
ability of non-US central banks to provide US dollars is limited by the exchange rate regime or by the availability of finite
US dollar reserves (McGuire and von Peter (2012)). Also, non-US banks cannot tap dollar funding by issuing insured US




































×ζt + νit (10)
As indicated by the under-braced term, equation (10) provides for a direct link between house price
growth of borrowing country i and US dollar funding conditions depending on country i’s US dollar
dependence. The second term describes the average of lending banking systems’ idiosyncratic shocks
ηbt weighted by their share in the market for international credit provision in borrowing country i in
the previous period.
Assuming that the lending banking system specific supply shocks, ηbt , the borrowing country
specific shock, νit , the global factor γt and the factor ζt reflecting US dollar refinancing conditions are
mutually uncorrelated, we can derive an expression for the time-varying conditional covariance of





























where HPsynci,jt denotes the conditional covariance of house price growth between borrowing coun-
tries i and j.The first under-braced term on the right hand side captures the effect on synchronization
that stems from the idiosyncratic shocks affecting common lending banking systems, i.e. the common
lender effect. This term is familiar fromLandier et al. (2017) who refer to it as the co-Herfindahl index.
For lending banking system specific shocks to have a big impact on house price growth synchroniza-
tion, a lending banking system must have high market shares in both borrowing countries i and j so
that the product of the market shares ωi,bt−1 and ω
j,b
t−1 becomes big.
The second under-braced term is the focus of our analysis in this paper. This term equals the
product of the dollar-dependence of each borrowing country, i.e. the dollar co-dependence as defined
in equation (5) above. The term reflects the impact of any two borrowing countries’ simultaneous
indirect exposure to fluctuations in US dollar funding conditions through their respective lending
banking systems on the synchronization of house price growth between these two countries. Hence,
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the two countries i and j could be highly dollar co-dependent even though they borrow from a distinct
set of lending banking systems.
To illustrate how shifts in the dollar co-dependence affect the synchronization of house price
growth, consider the following example. Suppose lending banking system C’s dollar dependence
stands at λCt = 15 percent, and lending banking system D’s dollar dependence equals λDt = 10
percent respectively. Let lending banking system C’s market shares in borrowing countries A and B
take the values ωC,At = 5 percent and ω
C,B
t = 8 percent, respectively. The corresponding market
shares for lending banking system D are ωD,At = 2 percent and ω
D,B
t = 12 percent. This results in
dollar dependencies DDAt = 0.95 percent and DDBt = 2.4 percent for borrowing countries A and
B respectively, and results in the dollar co-dependence CoDDA,Bt = 0.0228 percent. At time t + 1,
let λDt+1 increase by one percentage point to λDt+1 = 11, keeping all else constant. Thus, the dollar
co-dependence rises to CoDDA,Bt+1 = 0.0244 percent, or by 7.2 percent compared to CoDD
A,B
t at time
t. In line with equation (11), the increase in the dollar co-dependence CoDDi,jt translates into higher
synchronization of house price growth. Similarly, to study the cross-sectional variation of a change
in borrowing countries’ dollar dependence DDit, we introduce borrowing country F, with lending
banking systems’ market shares ωC,Ft = 1 percent and ω
D,F
t = 3 percent respectively. The dollar
dependence of borrowing country F yields DDFt = 0.45 percent. Hence, the dollar co-dependence of
the borrowing country pairs A,F and B,F are CoDDA,Ft = 0.0043 and CoDD
B,F
t = 0.01 respectively.




t , our model implies that the house price growth syn-
chronization of country pair A,B exceeds the synchronization for country pairs B,F and A,F in this
order.
3 Data and stylized facts
Our analysis on the relevance of the dollar dependence for house price growth relies on a
panel of OECD countries from 2000Q1 to 2015Q1 at quarterly frequency and covers house price
growth, empirical counterparts of the dollar dependenceDDit as well as the variables driving US dollar
funding conditions. Additionally, the analysis on the main mechanism for dollar co-dependence and
house price growth synchronization uses empirical counterparts of house price growth synchroniza-
tion HPsynci,jt , the co-Herfindahl index CoHFIi,j and dollar co-dependence CoDDi,j as well as bilateral
economic integration measures as controls. The analysis of intermediate steps draws on mortgage
credit growth, mortgage credit growth synchronization, and the growth in bilateral and aggregate
foreign claims of lending banking system b. Table (A.1) in the appendix provides an overview of vari-
able definitions and sources along with summary statistics. Here we discuss the sources of the most
important data and describe some stylized facts.
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House prices and mortgage credit: We measure house price growth over four quarters ahead
based on a country-level residential real house price index available from the OECD for 36 borrowing
countries.5 Similarly, mortgage credit growth is computed over four quarters ahead based on the times
series of credit to households and non-profit institutions serving households, provided by the BIS. For
borrowing countries i and j, the international synchronization of house price growth and mortgage
credit growth is measured as the product of house price and mortgage credit growth, resulting in 666
and 561 unique country pairs in the sample used for regression analysis, respectively.
US net capital inflows: Our primary measure of US dollar funding conditions are net capital in-
flows into theUnited States. Specifically, we use net financial inflows from theUS balance of payments
statistics as our measure of the variable CAPFLOW. We consider two normalizations of this variable
throughout the paper: First, following Hoffmann and Stewen (2020), we normalize with the total eq-
uity of all US commercial banks. Secondly, we set US net capital inflows in relationship to the total
volume of all lending banking systems’ outstanding US dollar denominated foreign claims recorded
in the CBS.
Dollar dependence: The dollar dependence λbt of lending banking system b is defined as the share
of a lending banking system’s stock of foreign liabilities denominated in US dollars relative to the
sum of all lending banking systems’ US dollar-denominated stock of foreign liabilities. We obtain
this data from the locational banking statistics by nationality, which provides information about the
currency composition of the cross-border positions of banks’ foreign offices. Aggregating the posi-
tions booked in each location allows for assessing the overall currency composition of a consolidated
banking system’s liabilities. Equipped with the currency composition, we compute λbt as defined in
equation (3) for 28 lending banking systems.6 Figure (8) demonstrates that lending banking systems
differ considerably in their reliance on US dollar funding.
Importantly, a small number of non-US lending banking systems account for the bulk of the
market for US dollar funding. In particular, the German, French, UK, Japanese, Swiss and Dutch lend-
ing banking systems combined account for 73 percent of the average global US dollar-denominated
stock of foreign liabilities during the sample period.7 Due to their dominant position in the US dollar
funding market, it is this set of non-US global banking systems that are most relevant for translating
5Our sample covers the following borrowing countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Lux-
emburg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, UK, United States. For further details on the OECD house price index please refer to appendix (7.1).
6The following lending banking systems are included: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxemburg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Panama,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Chinese Taipei and the UK. For further details on the computation of the
dollar dependence, please refer to appendix (7.2).
7Including the US lending banking system, the figure stands at 89 percent.
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shifts in US dollar funding conditions into foreign credit provision to borrowing countries, and thus
house price growth.
The market for foreign credit provision to borrowing countries mirrors the high market con-
centration in US dollar funding. This means that the same set of non-US global banking systems
have the highest market shares in borrowing countries, as shown in Figure (7). Specifically, the Ger-
man, French, UK, Japanese, Swiss and Dutch lending banking systems cumulatively take a 58 percent
market share in borrowing countries, averaged over the sample period. In light of the high degree
of concentration in the global banking network, some of the results presented in section (4) focus on
these six key lending banking systems, further referred to as “G6 lending banking systems”.
Our analysis categorically excludes theUS as lending banking system. The reasons are twofold:
First, the US is the currency’s home country, and thus in terms of timing — but not in terms of ab-
solute amounts — the primary provider of US dollar funding, and hosts with the US Federal Reserve
the lender of last US dollar funding resort. However, US net capital inflows — our preferred mea-
sure of US dollar funding variations — are a priori not exogenous to the funding demand from US
banks, while this is more likely to hold for non-US lending banking systems. Second, the exclusion
of US banks ensures that we more sharply identify the channel through which US dollar liquidity
is intermediated outside of the domain of the currency’s home country and home country affiliated
banks.
Market shares: Themarket sharesωi,b andωj,b of lending banking systems are essential inputs for
the empirical counterparts of the co-Herfindahl indexCoHFIi,j and the dollar co-dependenceCoDDi,j .
We compute these market shares based on positions of outstanding foreign claims recorded in the
consolidated banking statistics (CBS) on immediate counterparty basis, maintained as part of the in-
ternational banking statistics (IBS) by the BIS.8
The CBS provide a uniquely suitable database to capture the network topography of lending
banking systems’ foreign claims as it records banking groups’ consolidated “foreign claims”. “Foreign”
refers to the fact that these claims capture international credit by banks that are headquartered in a
country other than the borrowing country, i.e. banks that are of foreign nationality, irrespective of
whether this credit is cross-border or extended by a local subsidiary or branch. A consolidated view
of international bank lending is most suitable to our research question, as US dollar funding condi-
tions affect a banking group as a whole, regardless of the location of its offices. Internationally active
banking groups obtain US dollar funding through various channels — notably deposits, debt securi-
ties issuance, wholesale funding, FX derivatives — and from various locations (Aldasoro and Ehlers
8Foreign claims in the BIS terminology are the sum of international credit and local credit in local currency. Inter-
national credit is defined as the sum of cross-border credit in both local and foreign currency and local credit in foreign
currency. Local credit is defined as credit extended by a foreign banking group’s affiliates located in the borrowing country
itself.
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(2018)). Moreover, they actively shift US dollar funds across offices in different locations (Cetorelli
and Goldberg (2012)). The CBS record bank claims at a group level and thus abstract from interof-
fice positions that mainly reflect the internal funding within a banking group. Foreign claims reflect
the full foreign credit exposure of a bank, as they not only comprise loans, but also debt securities
holdings and net derivative exposures. We use data on the bilateral country-level claims of 28 lending
banking systems on the 36 borrowing countries in our sample.9
For the same lending banking system b, the market shares vary considerably across borrowing
countries, and substantially across lending banking systems for the same borrowing country. For
instance, consider themarket shares of the three biggest lending banking systems in the global banking
network: Germany, France and the UK. The German lending banking system’s market shares vary
between 7 percent and 35 percent on average over the sample period, compared to 3 percent and 20
percent for the French banking system on average over the sample period. The UK lending banking
system’s market shares range from 2 percent to 31 percent averaged over the sample period. German
banks hold on average over the sample period a combined market share in the borrowing countries
with the top three highest shares of about 34 percent, compared to 26 percent and 19 percent for UK
and French banks, respectively.
Moreover, borrowing countries in which a particular lending banking system has a compara-
ble market share are similarly exposed to global US dollar funding shocks transmitted through that
lending banking system. For instance, UK banks have roughly the same market share in both Brazil
and Chile. Hence, conditional on the dollar funding dependence of UK banks, and conditional on
the sensitivity of Brazilian and Chilean domestic banks’ mortgage lending to foreign borrowing from
UK banks, both Brazil’s and Chile’s house prices should react in similar fashion to US dollar funding
shocks channeled through UK banks. However, what matters in our context is not exposure to US
dollar funding shifts through just one lending banking system, but the average exposure through all
lending banking systems providing credit to Brazil and Chile as captured by the dollar dependence
concept.
Keeping inmind lending banking systems’ heterogenous exposure to global US dollar funding
shocks, a comparison of the market shares across lending banking systems for the same borrowing
country shows a heterogenous exposure to changes in US dollar funding conditions depending on
which lending banking system is dominant in the respective borrowing country’s market. For in-
stance, the German lending banking system’s market share in Hungary dominates the market share of
the French and UK lending banking systems. This implies that variations in US dollar funding condi-
tions are more likely to affect house price growth in Hungary through foreign claims of the German
lending banking system as compared to the French and UK lending banking systems.
9For further details on the computation of the market shares, please refer to appendix (7.3). Appendix (7.4) provides a
detailed view on the suitability of the CBS.
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The combination of the market shares ωi,b and the dollar funding dependence λb of lending
banking systems in country pairs’ dollar funding dependence DDit yields considerable heterogeneity
across borrowing countries, as shown in Figure (6). As a consequence, this variation over borrowing
countries spills over into variation of CoDDi,j over borrowing country pairs. Our identification in
equations (12) and (13) depends on this cross-country pair heterogeneity. For G6 lending banking
systems data is available throughout the entire sample period. The later availability of data for some
other lending banking systems only marginally affects the computation of the dollar dependence DDit.
4 Empirical framework and main results
In this section, we first establish thatUS net capital inflows affect house prices globally and that
the strength of this effect depends on the dollar dependence of borrowing countries. This result is a
necessary condition for our analysis of the international synchronization of house prices, and the role
of the dollar co-dependence. Specifically, the results will reveal that US net capital inflows are unique
in their impact on house prices as compared to other drivers ofUS dollar funding conditions discussed
in the literature. To this end, we take equation (10) on first conditionalmoments of house price growth
to the data. In essence, this step examines more formally the first evidence shown in section (2.2). In a
second step, we then explore the implications for international house price synchronization by taking
equation (11) to the data. It is this second step that allows us to establish that the dollar co-dependence
contributes significantly to house price synchronization.
4.1 House price growth, dollar dependence and US net capital inflows
We test equation (10) by running the following panel regression:
HPgrowth
i






t−1 ×RFt + νi + τt + ξit (12)
where HPgrowthit is the rate of house price growth over four quarters ahead in borrowing country
i, DDit−1 is country i’s dollar dependence as defined in section (2.1) and RFt denotes a vector of
variables driving US dollar funding conditions.10 Following Hoffmann and Stewen (2020), our focus
in this paper is on US net capital inflows, either scaled by total US bank equity or by the total of all
lending banking systems’ outstanding US dollar denominated foreign claims, as they affect the bank
lending capacity of non-US banks seeking refinancing in the US money market. To account for other
potential drivers of US dollar funding conditions, we include the Federal funds rate including shadow
10Note that all variables driving US dollar funding conditions considered in vectorRFt are coded such that an increase
in the variable implies improved US dollar funding conditions.
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rates to account for the effect of US monetary policy, the US broker dealer leverage and the VIX.11
This choice of variables emanates from the literature that has associated the latter three with the
global financial cycle and global liquidity. Ex post, however, US net capital inflows will empirically
remain the final contender determining the fluctuations in US dollar funding conditions that make
lending banking systems adjust their provision of foreign credit and thus drive house price growth in
borrowing countries. Following the discussion in section (2.3) the dollar dependenceDDit−1 enters the
specification lagged as the US dollar funding needs of lending banking systems are pre-determined at
time t when shifts in the US dollar funding conditions materialize. This allows us to study how the
effect of shifts in the latter on house price growth is modulated by the exposure of a country’s lending
banking systems to the US dollar.
The coefficient vector β2 is our main coefficient vector of interest. The coefficient should
be positive in line with the first evidence on the role of the dollar dependence DDit, as portrayed in
Figure (4). The specification (12) is a more formal test of this first evidence, and allows us to identify
themost relevant driver of US dollar funding conditions. To isolate the supply driven lending channel
in response to a change in US dollar funding conditions, we include country and time fixed effects,
νi and τt, to control for time-invariant country characteristics and time-varying factors affecting all
borrowing countries at the same point in time homogeneously, respectively. Note that the stand alone
term of the vector RFt is absorbed by the full set of time effects. We cluster standard errors by the
time dimension to account for correlation across borrowing countries at each point in time.
Table (1) shows the results of estimating equation (12). Columns (1) to (4) and (5) to (8) show
the effect of the dollar dependence interacted with our two measures of US net capital inflows —
scaled either by total US banking equity or by the total of all lending banking systems’ outstanding
US dollar denominated foreign claims —, respectively, on their own and in combination with other
candidate measures of US dollar funding variations. The specification includes borrowing country
and year-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by the time dimension. Given the high
concentration in the global banking network, the results focus on the G6 lending banking systems as
identified in section (3).
Notably, only the coefficient on the dollar dependence interactedwith theUS net capital flows,
scaled in either way, enters positively and statistically significantly. Thus, the effect of US net capital
inflows on house price growth is increasing in borrowing countries’ dollar dependence. The coeffi-
cients on the other interaction terms do not withstand statistically significantly in a horserace with
US net capital inflows, as shown in in columns (2) to (4) and (6) to (8).
Prior to proceeding with the analysis on synchronization, these results provide us with two
insights. First the dollar dependence matters for the effect of US dollar funding conditions on house
11The VIX is a volatility index constructed by the Chicago Board Options Exchange and recognized as “fear gauge” in
global financial markets.
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price growth worldwide. The estimates for coefficient β2 in equation (12) imply that house price
growth increases by 2 to 3 percentage points in response to an increase in a borrowing country’s dollar
dependence DDit by 10 percentage points, evaluated at the mean of US net capital inflows, regardless
of the scaling factor. Second, in line with the conjecture presented in section (2.2), the results validate
US net capital inflows as the relevant measure of fluctuations in US dollar funding conditions. That
is, the other potential drivers of US dollar funding conditions do not stand for a notion of shifts in US
dollar funding conditions that improve the funding conditions of non-US banks, in turn leading to
an increase in their foreign lending and house price growth in borrowing countries. In contrast, the
relationship only holds forUS net capital inflows as determinant of non-US banks’ funding conditions
in US dollars.
4.2 House price synchronization and dollar co-dependence
In the next step, we explore the implications of our framework for house price synchroniza-
tion. We translate equation (11) from the theoretical setup into the following panel regression
HPsync
i,j
t = const+ δ CoHFI
i,j
t−s + β CoDD
i,j
t−s + CONTROLSt + θi,j + µi,t + φj,t + ε
i,j
t (13)
where HPsynci,jt denotes the conditional covariance of house price growth between borrowing coun-
tries i and j. Our empirical measure of HPsynci,jt is the product of the rates of house price growth
over four quarters ahead in country i and j. The co-Herfindahl index CoHFIi,jt−s captures the com-
mon lender effect adapted from Landier et al. (2017) to the international context. The regressor of
special interest is the dollar co-dependence CoDDi,jt−s. Consistent with equation (10), the specification
imposes a lag s on both regressors as exposures to lending banking systems and US dollar funding
need to be pre-determined. The coefficient β should be unambiguously positively signed as an in-
crease in the dollar co-dependence implies that borrowing countries i and j are simultaneously more
exposed to their lending banking systems’ reaction to fluctuations in US dollar funding conditions,
strengthening the link between US dollar funding conditions and the international synchronization
of house price growth. Intuitively, and in line with the theoretical setup in equation (11), US dollar
funding conditions do not feature explicitly in equation (13), because the identification rests on bor-
rowing country pairs’ heterogenous dollar co-dependence at each point in time, and not on the time
variation in US dollar funding conditions.
The vector CONTROLS comprises variables controlling for the time-varying bilateral integra-
tion between borrowing countries i and j, notably bilateral trade integration to control for demand
driven house price co-movement resulting from income growth generated by bilateral trade. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the country pair level to account for serial correlation within country
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pairs. Note that the saturation with a rich set of fixed effects results in a demanding specification
that allows us to control for most conceivable confounders and therefore helps us to considerably
strengthen the causal interpretation of our results. In particular, the specification contains country-
time fixed effects, µi,t and φj,t, for both borrowing countries i and j . They absorb any observed and
unobserved time-varying heterogeneity at the country level, including factors accounting for credit
demand and time-varying structural characteristics of the respective domestic financial andmortgage
market sectors. Country pair fixed effects θi,j control for time-invariant factors at the country pair
level, and thus also for time-invariant features for each country separately. Moreover, global shocks
affecting borrowing countries and lending banking systems alike are captured by time-fixed effects
spanned by the country-time fixed effects.
Having established a statistically significant effect of US dollar funding conditions on house
price growth, we now turn to synchronization and take equation (13) to the data. Our analytical
framework does not provide guidance about the time horizon at which the dollar co-dependence and
US dollar funding conditions should affect house price synchronization. Therefore, we test equation
(13) at several lags s of the regressors CoHFIi,jt−s and CoDD
i,j
t−s.
Columns (1), (4), (7), and (10) in Table (2) show the benchmark results and provide strong evidence
in favor of our hypothesis. The coefficient on the dollar co-dependence is positive and statistically
significant at the 1 percent significance level, in line with the prediction that an increasing dollar co-
dependence strengthens the link between the synchronization of house prices and US dollar funding
conditions. The estimate in column (10) implies that a 10 percentage point increase in the dollar co-
dependence of an average country pair is associated with a 0.0005 percentage point increase in house
price synchronization, or 38 percent increase relative to the mean of house price synchronization.
The addition of country-time fixed effects for each borrowing country in columns (5), (8) and
(11), lowers the statistical significance compared to the benchmark, but leaves the coefficient on the
dollar co-dependence significant at the 10 percent significance level. This implies that the rich set of
fixed effects is effective at filtering out confounding factors at the borrowing country level, leaving our
results robust to the elimination of demand side drivers of house price growth such as the demand
for mortgage credit.
The result is robust to increasing the number of lags for each specification. Regardless of the
specification, the coefficient on CoDDi,jt−s increases in line with lag s from columns (1-3) to (10-12),
suggesting that it takes some time for changes in US dollar funding conditions to percolate through
the global banking system until banks in borrowing countries translate foreign funds into mortgages,
finally driving house prices and synchronization patterns.
We further buttress our result by including time-varying controls at the borrowing country
pair level. Specifically, we control for bilateral trade integration. Trade integration is measured as
the sum of bilateral imports of country i and j, scaled by the sum of respective nominal GDPs. At the
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quarterly level, this measure is noisy by construction. We therefore expect that this control introduces
attenuation bias and further increases standard errors on our coefficient of interest on CoDDi,jt−s. The
results in columns (3), (6), (9), (12) are in line with this reasoning, as shown by the loss of significance at
conventional levels of statistical significance. Importantly, however, the coefficient estimates remain
largely unchanged in magnitude, albeit slightly smaller in line with attenuation bias manifesting itself.
The coefficient on bilateral trade does not enter significantly, meaning that bilateral trade integration
does not drive house price synchronization. Note that this control is not available for all borrow-
ing country pairs. This leads to a lower number of observations when controlling for the bilateral
integration of trade.
The analytical framework put forward by Landier et al. (2017) suggests that the idiosyncratic
shocks affecting common lending banking systems should be a major driver of house price synchro-
nization. At the international level, however, we do not find supportive evidence, as shown by the
mostly insignificant coefficient estimate for δ on the co-Herfindahl index CoHFIi,jt−s. The coefficient
estimate for δ is negative and statistically significant in columns (7), (10) and (11), but in terms of mag-
nitude does not offset the coefficient on the dollar co-dependence, as the estimate for δ is smaller by
a factor of 10−1. That is, if anything, the common exposure of borrowing countries slightly dampens
the house price synchronization, and generally does not seem to be driving house price synchroniza-
tion at the international level. Instead, it is the dollar co-dependence that is the relevant driver of
house price synchronization in the international setting. The coefficient on the co-Herfindahl index
possibly remains mostly insignificant because the variance of the idiosyncratic shock ηbt — comprised
in the theoretical counterpart α2σ2η of coefficient δ in equation (11) — is too small for the coefficient
δ to become significant.
5 Transmission mechanism
The previous section documents that the reduced-form implications of the statistical model
regarding the sensitivity of house price growth to US net capital inflows and the international syn-
chronization of house prices hold up well in the data. In addition, the theoretical framework posits
that it is foreign lending by non-US banks that is the key transmitter of fluctuations in US dollar
funding conditions to house prices around the globe. Furthermore, as fluctuations in US dollar fund-
ing conditions trigger an international credit supply shock to borrowing country banks, one would
expect that an expansion ofmortgage credit growth is a key transmitter of an easing ofUS dollar fund-
ing conditions to local housing markets. Therefore, mortgage lending of borrowing country banks
should bemore sensitive to US net capital inflows inmore dollar dependent borrowing countries, and
mortgage lending should be more synchronized among pairs of borrowing countries that are more
co-dependent on US dollar funding. Similarly, foreign lending of lending banking systems with rela-
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tively high dollar dependence should respond more to US net capital inflows. We expect the effect to
be especially pronounced when foreign lending is denominated in US dollars given that in our theo-
retical framework foreign lending in US dollars is financed by US dollar liabilities. We also expect the
effect to be stronger for foreign lending to borrowing country banks as opposed to non-banks, as the
former are the central intermediaries of foreign funds. In this section, we explore these implications.
5.1 Implications for mortgage credit growth and its synchronization
The results reported in the previous section demonstrate howUS net capital inflows drive the
international synchronization of house price growth through their effect on the US dollar funding
conditions of non-US global banks. Next, we present evidence for an important intermediate step
in this mechanism. A reminder is in order: The mechanism relies on US net capital inflows causing
shifts in US dollar funding conditions, which in turn makes non-US banks adjust the foreign lending
to banks in borrowing countries. In a first instance, banks in borrowing countries are conjectured to
channel the additional foreign funds into mortgage credit. House prices then react due to the change
in mortgage credit supply. Thus, the effect on house price growth and its synchronization should
first and foremost show up in an effect on mortgage credit growth and its synchronization across
borrowing countries, respectively.
To test this idea, we adapt equation (12) by replacing house price growth as dependent variable
with mortgage credit growth in borrowing country i, and estimate the panel regression
MGgrowth
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t−1 ×RFt + νi + τt + ξit (14)
where MGgrowthit is the rate of mortgage credit growth over four quarters ahead in borrowing country
i. All other variables are as defined in equation (12). Coefficient vector β2 is our main coefficient
vector of interest, and should be positively signed. The specification includes country and time fixed
effects νi and τt and standard errors are cluster by the time dimension as in equation (12).
Table (3) reveals that the dollar dependence is at work for this intermediate step in the causal
chain of our mechanism. Focusing on the G6 lending banking systems, columns (1) to (4) and (5) to
(8) show the effect of the dollar dependence interacted with the two measures of US net capital in-
flows, on their own and in a horse race with other variables driving US dollar funding conditions.
The coefficient on the dollar dependence interacted with US net capital flows, regardless of scaling,
enters almost exclusively positively and statistically significantly. In terms of quantitative effect, an
increase in a borrowing country’s dollar dependence DDit by 10 percentage points is equivalent to a
rise in mortgage credit growth in the range of 4.1 to 4.7 percentage points when evaluating US net




t amplifies the effect of US dollar funding conditions on mortgage credit growth, and supports
the notion that domestic banks channel additional funds obtained from lending banking systems into
the domestic mortgage market. Moreover, the coefficient on the stand alone term DDit is positively
significant, implying that an increase in the dollar dependence itself raises mortgage credit growth.
In addition, the dollar dependence also enhances the effect of a decline of the Federal funds rate on
mortgage credit growth, albeit with a quantitatively smaller effect. The broker-dealer leverage has a
negative statistically significant effect on mortgage credit growth worldwide, but the effect remains
negligibly small. Hence, US net capital inflows prove to be the quantitatively most relevant determi-
nant of non-US global banks’ US dollar funding conditions.
The results show that the dollar dependence not only matters for the effect of US dollar fund-
ing conditions on house price growth, but in a first instance also for mortgage credit growth. This is
evidence in favor of domestic banks forwarding the international credit supply induced by changes
in US dollar funding conditions to domestic mortgages markets, leading to pressure on house prices.
Next, we test whether the insights on the synchronization of house price growth derived in section
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where MGsynci,jt denotes the conditional covariance of mortgage credit growth between borrowing
countries i and j. Parallel to equation (13), wemeasureMGsynci,jt as the product of the rates ofmortgage
credit growth over four quarters ahead in borrowing country i and j. All else remains as specified
in equation (13). In particular, the coefficient β should enter positively such that a rising dollar co-
dependence entails a higher synchronization of mortgage credit growth. In line with equation (13) for
house price synchronization, the specification also includes the full battery of fixed effects to control
for observed and unobserved time-varying factors at the levels of countries i and j, as well as for
time-invariant country pair characteristics.
Results in columns (1), (4), (7), and (10) of Table (4) highlight that dollar co-dependence intensi-
fies the effect of US dollar funding conditions on mortgage credit growth synchronization. As before,
the coefficient on the dollar co-dependence is statistically significant at the 1 percent significance level.
The results remain robust to saturating the specification with country-time fixed effects, leaving re-
sults significant at the 5 percent significance level as show in columns (2), (5), (8), (11). Also in line
with the results for house price synchronization, we find that the effect of the dollar co-dependence
is rising over time as given by the increase in lag order s.
In columns columns (3), (6), (9), (12) we control for bilateral trade. The attenuation bias in-
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troduced through this relatively noisy measure of bilateral trade lowers the magnitude of the coef-
ficient. Nevertheless, the coefficient on the dollar co-dependence remains statistically significant at
the 10 percent level. Coupled with the previous finding for house price synchronization, the result
obtained from a demanding specification comprising country-time fixed effects in addition to a time-
varying country pair-level control variable, bilateral trade, corroborates the importance of the dollar
co-dependence for the effect of US dollar funding conditions on real estate markets in borrowing
countries.
The results for equation (13) also help to shed further light on idiosyncratic shocks to common
lending banking systems. The coefficient estimate for δ on the co-Herfindahl index CoHFIi,jt−s comes
in positively in several specifications, but is quantitatively dwarfed by the coefficient on the dollar co-
dependence. Combined with the occasionally negative coefficient estimate for δ in the test for house
price synchronization, at the international level evidence on the effect of the co-Herfindahl is mixed
qualitatively, and negligible quantitatively. This is consistent with our earlier findings for house price
synchronization, and makes the dollar co-dependence a key component of the effect of US dollar
funding conditions on real estate markets globally.
5.2 Implications for foreign credit growth
In this section we go back one more step in the causal chain of our mechanism. For US dollar
funding conditions to affect the mortgage credit provided by banks in borrowing countries, at first
the foreign lending of lending banking systems to borrowing country banks should react to changes
in US dollar funding conditions. We therefore study the effect of US dollar funding conditions on
lending banking systems’ foreign lending.
Similar to section (2.2), we provide a first look at the data to establish that the supply of foreign
credit by lending banking systems co-moves with US net capital inflows, and that the co-movement
is amplified by lending banking systems’ dependence on US dollar funding. For each lending banking
system b in our sample and for the period 2000Q1 to 2015Q1 we investigate the link between the
foreign bank credit supply and US net capital inflows by running the time series regression
∆Lbt
Lbt−4
= βbCAPFLOWt + µ





is the growth rate of aggregate foreign credit provided by lending banking system b over
four quarters ahead and CAPFLOWt denotes US net capital inflows scaled by total US banking equity.
The coefficient βb measures the response of lending banking system b’s foreign lending to CAPFLOWt.
Figure (9) plots the estimates of βb against each lending banking system b’s dollar dependence λbt , i.e.
the market share of lending banking system b in the global market for US dollar-denominated bank
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borrowing. The figure depicts a positive relationship between the dollar dependence λbt and the sensi-
tivity of lending banking systems’ foreign lending to US net capital inflows, implying that the effect of
US dollar funding conditions on foreign lending of lending banking systems is increasing in their ex-
posure to US dollar funding. This positive relationship is robust to excluding the G6 lending banking
systems. In line with the discussion in section (2.2), the positive relationship displayed in Figure (9)
implies that the bank lending capacity of non-US global banks is indeed susceptible to US net capital
inflows. This is because the inflows represent a positive refinancing shock to the US financial system
and thus to any non-US banks seeking to raise funding from it.
We confirm the insights from this first look at the data more formally by testing the relation-

















measures the growth rate of bilateral claims of lending banking system b on borrowing
country i over four quarters ahead, Dbt−1 denotes lending banking system b’s dollar dependence, and
RFt denotes the vector of variables driving US dollar funding conditions.12 The dollar dependence
D
b
t−1 enters the specification lagged as lending banking systems’ US dollar funding needs are pre-
determined at time t when shifts in the US dollar funding conditions occur. The granularity of the
bilateral data structure allows us to isolate the supply effect of fluctuations in US dollar funding by
including borrowing country-time fixed effects µi,t. Similar to the Khwaja and Mian (2008) estima-
tors, these fixed effects absorb time-varying observed and unobserved heterogeneity at the borrowing
country level, in particular demand for foreign credit. As the technique exploits the within-variation
of each borrowing-country-time combination, we postulate that the foreign credit provided by dif-
ferent lending banking systems to the same borrowing country is broadly comparable e.g. in terms
of average maturities and lending purpose. In addition, lending-banking-system-borrowing-country
fixed effects θb,i control for time-invariant factors. The stand alone term of the vector RFt is ab-
sorbed by the time fixed effects comprised in µi,t. Standard errors are clustered at the borrowing
12For the purpose of this analysis, bilateral claims are measured by international claims, i.e. bilateral claims excluding
foreign subsidiaries’ local claims in local currency. This later allows us to distinguish between claims on the non-bank
sector versus claims on the banking sector, i.e. interbank claims. This sectoral breakdown is available for international
claims, while it is not for foreign claims. As an exception to the other parts of this paper, we therefore use international
claims. Moreover, we argue that for this specific analysis international claims better identify the effect of US dollar funding
shifts on foreign bank credit, as local credit in local currency is often financed by local currency deposits. The exclusion of
local claims in local currency therefore allows focussing on the response of house price growth tomortgage credit financed
by foreign credit obtained i) from foreign banks’ subsidiaries in foreign currency, and ii) from abroad in foreign or local
currency. We remove all observations with bilateral international credit below 10 million US dollars, and winsorize the
growth rate of bilateral claims below the 1st and above the 99th percentile.
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country level and by the time dimension. We estimate the regression by weighted least squares, us-
ing Db as weight. The coefficient vector β2 is our main coefficient vector of interest. The coefficient
should be positively signed in line with the first evidence presented in Figure (9).
The results are recorded in Table (5). Columns (3) and (4) show the positive and statistically
significant coefficients on the interaction of the dollar dependence Dbt−1 and the two measures of US
net capital inflows. The coefficients indicate that an increase in a lending banking system’s dollar de-
pendence by 10 percentage points are associated with an increase in bilateral foreign credit growth by
4.8 to 5 percent for the two measures of US net capital inflows evaluated at their mean, respectively.
The effect is offset by a small margin by the negative significant coefficient on the stand alone term of
the dollar dependence Dbt−1. The coefficient on this stand alone term implies that an increase in Dbt−1
by 10 percentage points is associated with a decline in foreign lending by 0.3 percentage points. Thus
the overall effect of a change in Dbt−1 remains positive and economically significant. The implications
of this result are twofold. First, the results confirm that shifts in US dollar funding conditions drive
the foreign lending of lending banking systems. Second, lending banking systems’ heterogenous ex-
posure to US dollar funding is an essential ingredient for this intermediate step in the causal chain
between US dollar funding conditions and house price growth. As shown in columns (1) and (2) of
Table (5), the results hold when we focus on the G6 lending banking systems only. The coefficients
in columns (1) and (2) signify that — evaluated at the mean of US net capital inflows — foreign credit
growth of G6 lending banking systems increases by 3.5 to 3.8 percentage points in response to a 10
percentage point increase in a lending banking system’s dollar dependence.
Next, we differentiate the results by counterparty sector in borrowing countries. That is, we
study separately the effect of US net capital inflows on foreign lending to banks and non-banks in bor-
rowing countries. Borrowing country banks are conjectured to translate foreign credit received from
lending banking systems into mortgage credit, in turn affecting house prices. In contrast, non-banks
do not perform this role as financial intermediary. Also, the maturity of bank-to-bank positions in the
global banking network is known to be more short term compared to bank-to-non-bank positions,
making bank-to-bank positions themore likelymargin of adjustment of non-US global banks’ foreign
claims (McGuire and von Peter (2012)). Hence, when an increase in US net capital inflows eases the
financing constraint of non-US lending banking systems, they provide more credit to banks abroad
rather than to non-banks, in line with the “double-decker structure of international banking” (Bruno
and Shin (2014)). Therefore, we expect that the effect of US dollar funding conditions on foreign
lending of more dollar dependent lending banking systems is more pronounced for foreign lending
to banks. Foreign lending to non-banks is expected to be less sensitive to fluctuations in refinancing
conditions of global banks (Hoffmann et al. (2019)).
The results in columns (5) to (8) in Table (5) are consistent with this conjecture. For both
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measures of US net capital inflows, their effect on foreign lending by more dollar dependent lending
banking systems is statistically more significant at the 1 percent level when a country borrows in-
directly via its banks. Conversely, the effect enters at a lower significance level of 5 percent when a
country’s non-banks receive foreign lending from lending banking systems. We interpret this finding
as evidence in favor of bank-to-bank lending being the primary transmission channel of the effect of
US net capital inflows on house price growth.
Finally, we zoom in on the effect of US dollar funding conditions on foreign lending de-
nominated in US dollars. A feature of the theoretical framework is the assumption that US dollar-
denominated lending must be fully backed by US dollar-denominated liabilities, meaning that shifts
in US dollar funding conditions directly translate into changes in foreign lending. Hence, we test
whether the effect of fluctuations in US dollar funding conditions on foreign lending is stronger
when the latter is denominated in US dollars as compared to other currencies. A consistent currency
breakdown is not available for the bilateral foreign lending data. Hence, we work with the currency
breakdown available for aggregate lending from lending banking system b to its respective borrowing
countries i. Accordingly, we run the panel regression separately for foreign lending denominated in
all currencies, US dollars, and other currencies:
∆Lb,ct
Lb,ct−4













measures the growth rate in aggregate foreign claims of lending banking system b de-
nominated in currency c over four quarters ahead, Dbt−1denotes lending banking system b’s dollar
dependence, and RFt denotes again the vector of variables driving US dollar funding conditions.
13 The specification features lending banking system fixed effects νb and time fixed effects τt, and is
estimated by weighted least squares, using Db as weight. Standard errors are two-way clustered by
lending banking system and time. The coefficient vector β2 should be positively signed, indicating
that the dollar dependence Dbt−1 enhances the co-movement between US dollar funding conditions
and aggregate foreign lending.
Table (6) shows the results for foreign lending separately for each currency c. The coefficients
on the interaction of the dollar dependence Dbt−1 and the two measures of US net capital inflows
are partly not only more statistically significant, but also larger in magnitude when foreign lending
is denominated in US dollars. In contrast, the coefficient on the interaction term does not enter
13Data on aggregate foreign lending by currency is derived from the BIS locational banking statistics by nationality.
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statistically significantly for foreign lending denominated in other currencies.14 These results lend
further support to the importance of lending banking systems’ dollar dependence in facilitating the
transmission of fluctuations in US dollar funding conditions on house price growth and ultimately
house price synchronization. They also provide evidence that foreign lending in US dollars is more
sensitive to shifts in US dollar funding conditions as compared to foreign lending in other currencies,
consistent with US dollar lending being fully funded by US dollar liabilities.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that capital inflows into the US are an important determinant of
house price co-movement around the globe. Non-US global banks borrow in US dollars, which they
lend on to borrowing countries. As capital inflows into the United States improve funding conditions
for borrowers in US dollars, they contribute to the synchronization of foreign interbank lending to
countries that borrow from US dollar-dependent non-US global creditor banks. This variation in
lending supply then affects local real estate markets in the borrowing countries, leading to an inter-
national synchronization in mortgage credit growth and house price growth. As a result, borrowing
country pairs whose non-US global creditor banks are more dependent on US dollar funding exhibit
higher house price synchronization in response to shifts in US dollar funding conditions. Neither
shocks to common lending banking systems nor direct borrowing from US banks is the main driver
of synchronization. What we find to matter most is the dependence of a borrowing country on US
dollar funding via its lending banking systems. A key feature of our results is that it is not US global
banks that play the biggest role in transmitting the shifts in US dollar funding conditions to borrow-
ing countries. Instead, the dollar dependence of non-US global banks accounts for the effect on house
pricesworldwide. Our findings highlight how the topography of international bank lending affects the
synchronization of real outcomes, and in particular of real estate markets, illustrating that the “double
decker structure of the global banking system” has first-order implications for the synchronization of
real outcomes at the global level.
14Data on foreign lending denominated in other currencies than the US dollar are obtained as residual of foreign claims
denominated in all currencies minus foreign claims denominated in US dollars.
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Figure 1:
House price synchronization, 1970Q1-2015Q1
Note: This figure exhibits a box plot of the pairwise international house price synchronization over 782 country pairs
at each point in time for the period 1970Q1-2015Q1, with the thick blue bars indicating the interquartile range. House
price synchronization is computed as the product of the four quarter ahead house price growth in countries i and j
constituting a country pair. House price growth is calculated based on the country-wide residential real house price
indices obtained for 36 countries from the OECD.
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Figure 2:
US dollar-denominated liabilities as share of total liabilities of
non-US lending banking systems, 2000Q1-2017Q4
Note: This figure depicts non-US lending banking systems’ stock of liabilities denominated in US dollars relative to their
stock of liabilities denominated in all currencies, averaged over German, French, UK, Japanese, Swiss and Dutch lending




US net capital inflows, 2000Q1 - 2016Q4
Note: US net capital inflows are obtained from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis International Transaction Statistics.
Total US banking equity of commercial banks in the US stems from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council. Total US dollar assets denote all lending banking systems’ outstanding US dollar denominated foreign claims
recorded in the BIS consolidated banking statistics.
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Figure 4:
Borrowing countries’ dollar dependence and estimated sensitivity of
house price growth to US net capital inflows
Note: This graph plots for each borrowing country i and for the period 2000Q1 to 2015Q1 the estimated sensitivity
of house price growth to US net capital inflows scaled by total US commercial bank equity — obtained from running
regression (6) — against a borrowing country’s dollar dependence. House price growth is computed as the four quarter
ahead change in the country-wide residential real house price index obtained from the OECD. US net capital inflows
are obtained from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis International Transaction Statistics. Total US banking equity of
commercial banks in the US stems from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council. A borrowing country’s
dollar dependence is computed as specified in equation (4). The sample is truncated at 5 and 95 percent of US net financial
inflows scaled by total US banking equity, and of lending banking systems’ dollar dependence, respectively.
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Figure 5:
Borrowing countries’ dollar dependence and estimated sensitivity of house price growth to
other drivers of dollar refinancing conditions
Note: This graph plots for each borrowing country i and for the period 2000Q1 to 2015Q1 the estimated sensitivity of
house price growth to other drivers of dollar refinancing conditions — obtained from running regressions similar to
equation (6) — against a borrowing country’s dollar dependence, separately for each driver of dollar refinancing condi-
tions. House price growth is computed as the four quarter ahead change in the country-wide residential real house price
index obtained from the OECD. Alternative drivers of US dollar liquidity (global liquidity, VIX, broker-dealer leverage,
Fed funds rate and the broad dollar index) are coded such that an increase implies an improvement in US dollar funding
conditions. Table (A.1) indicates the definition and source of these alternative drivers. A borrowing country’s dollar
dependence is computed as specified in equation (4). The sample is truncated at 5 and 95 percent of US net financial
inflows scaled by total US banking equity, and of lending banking systems’ dollar dependence, respectively. For compar-
ison to Figure (4), the upper left panel replicates the relationship between borrowing countries’ dollar dependence and
the sensitivity of house price growth to US net capital inflows.
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Figure 6:
Dollar dependence by borrowing country
Note: A borrowing country’s dollar dependence is computed as specified in equation (4), and for each borrowing country
the dollar dependence is averaged over the period 2000Q1-2015Q1.
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Figure 7:
Market shares of lending banking systems in foreign credit provision
Note: Market shares are computed based on the BIS consolidated banking statistics, and averaged over the sample period
2000Q1-2015Q1 and over each lending banking system’s borrowing countries.
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Figure 8:














US CH JP GB DE FR CA NL ES SE BE AU TW IT BR CN KR TR IN NO AT DK PT RU MX IE ZA BH LU MY GR CL FI PA ID BM CY KY BS PH IM MO JE GG
Note: The dollar dependence of lending banking systems is averaged over the period 2000Q1-2015Q1.
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Figure 9:
Dollar dependence and estimated sensitivity of lending banking systems’
foreign lending to US net capital inflows
Note: This graph plots for each lending banking system b and for the period 2000Q1 to 2015Q1 the estimated sensitivity
of foreign lending to US net capital inflows scaled by total US commercial bank equity — obtained from running regres-
sion (16) — against a lending banking system’s dollar dependence, i.e. the market share of lending banking system b in
the global market for US dollar-denominated bank borrowing. Foreign lending is obtained as four quarter ahead change
in lending banking systems’ aggregate foreign claims. Foreign claims are obtained from the BIS consolidated banking
statistics. US net capital inflows are obtained from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis International Transaction Statis-
tics. Total US banking equity of commercial banks in the US stems from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council. A lending banking’s dollar dependence is computed as specified in equation (3).
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Table 1:
House price growth and US dollar funding conditions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable
DDit-1 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.752] [0.743] [1.268] [0.629] [0.296] [0.274] [0.627] [0.185]
DDit-1 X Capflow/equityt 0.015** 0.016* 0.016* 0.016*
[1.972] [1.872] [1.882] [1.861]
DDit-1 X Capflow/dollar assetst 0.243*** 0.256*** 0.253*** 0.255**
[2.494] [2.357] [2.332] [2.329]
DDit-1 X Federal funds ratet 0.00007 0.00001 -0.00003 0.00009 0.00004 -0.00001
[0.211] [0.023] [-0.096] [0.261] [0.104] [-0.039]
DDit-1 X Broker-dealer leveraget -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000
[-1.039] [-1.222] [-0.678] [-0.883]
DDit-1 X Vixt -0.00002 -0.00003
[-0.307] [-0.394]
countryi FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
year-quarter FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
year-quarter clustering yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,264 1,264 1,264 1,264 1,264 1,264 1,264 1,264
R2 0.386 0.386 0.386 0.386 0.387 0.387 0.387 0.388
Robust t-statistics in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
House price growth
Note: This table reports the results from estimating equation (12) for the period from 2000Q1 to 2015Q1. The dependent
variable HPgrowthit is the growth rate of house prices in borrowing country i over four quarters ahead. The explanatory
variables are country i’s dollar dependence DDit−1 lagged by one quarter and the interaction of the lagged dollar depen-
dence with the following variables driving US dollar funding conditions: US net capital inflows scaled either by total US
banking equity or by total outstanding US dollar denominated foreign claims (dollar assets), the Federal funds rate, the
broker-dealer leverage and the VIX. These variables are coded such that an increase implies an improvement in US dollar
funding conditions. The dollar dependenceDDit−1 is computed based on borrowing countries’ exposures to G6 lending
banking systems. Column (1) and (5) show the result for the interaction using US net capital inflows, scaled by total US
banking equity and by total outstanding US dollar denominated foreign claims (dollar assets), respectively. Columns (2)
to (4) and (6) to (8) show the results for horse races of interactions using US net capital inflows against interactions using
alternative drivers of US dollar funding conditions. The specification includes country and time fixed effects, and stan-
dard errors clustered by the year-quarter time dimension. Coefficients of stand alone terms of US net financial inflows
and other drivers of US dollar funding conditions are not reported since they are eliminated by time fixed effects. The
constant is omitted. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Mortgage credit growth and US dollar funding conditions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable
DDit-1 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.016***
[7.525] [6.97] [7.736] [4.642] [6.083] [6.377] [6.991] [4.364]
DDit-1 X Capflow/equityt 0.01 0.028** 0.028** 0.028**
[1.025] [2.072] [2.074] [2.129]
DDit-1 X Capflow/dollar assetst 0.246* 0.398*** 0.379*** 0.38***
[1.832] [2.578] [2.464] [2.589]
DDit-1 X Federal funds ratet 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001**
[2.948] [2.28] [2.057] [3.163] [2.392] [2.096]
DDit-1 X Broker-dealer leveraget -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000**
[-2.15] [-2.064] [-2.094] [-2.025]
DDit-1 X Vixt -0.000 -0.000
[-0.889] [-1]
countryi FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
year-quarter FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
year-quarter clustering yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,310 1,310 1,310 1,310 1,310 1,310 1,310 1,310
R2 0.506 0.508 0.510 0.51 0.507 0.509 0.511 0.511
Robust t-statistics in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Mortgage credit growth
Note: This table reports the results from estimating equation (14) for the period from 2000Q1 to 2015Q1. The dependent variable
MGgrowth
i
t is the growth rate of mortgage credit in borrowing country i over four quarters ahead. The explanatory variables are
country i’s dollar dependence DDit−1 lagged by one quarter and the interaction of the lagged dollar dependence with the following
variables drivingUS dollar funding conditions: US net capital inflows scaled either by total US banking equity or by total outstanding
US dollar denominated foreign claims (dollar assets), the Federal funds rate, the broker-dealer leverage and the VIX. These variables
are coded such that an increase implies an improvement in US dollar funding conditions. The dollar dependence dollar dependence
DD
i
t−1 is computed based on borrowing countries’ exposures to G6 lending banking systems. Column (1) and (5) show the result
for the interaction using US net capital inflows, scaled by total US banking equity and by total outstanding US dollar denominated
foreign claims (dollar assets), respectively. Columns (2) to (4) and (6) to (8) show the results for horse races of interactions using US
net capital inflows against interactions using alternative drivers of US dollar funding conditions. The specification includes country
and time fixed effects, and standard errors clustered by the year-quarter time dimension. Coefficients of stand alone terms of US net
financial inflows and other drivers of US dollar funding conditions are not reported since they are eliminated by time fixed effects.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7.1 OECD house price index
Our analysis is based on country-level residential house price indices provided by the OECD.
This data source is particularly suitable since the underlying house price data feeding into the index
construction are of comparable quality, abstracting from differences in the definitions of the types
of dwellings. Moreover, the relative homogeneity of OECD member countries in terms of structural
features of their economies and financial market developments is advantageous for our identification
strategy as time fixed effects in the regression analysis eliminate many time-varying confounding fac-
tors relevant to this country group. In addition to actual OECD member countries, the house price
indices are also available for Brazil, China, Russia and South Africa. The price indices of Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania are available but excluded due to a relatively short time series characterized by
extreme variation. Our final sample consists of 36 borrowing countries.
7.2 Computation of dollar dependence
A lending banking system b’s dollar dependence λbt is defined as the fraction of global foreign
bank borrowing denominated inUS dollars accounted for by banks headquartered in lending banking
system b. The computation of this ratio requires data on lending banking systems’ stock of liabilities
denominated in US dollars. To identify the currency composition, we use the BIS locational banking
statistics by nationality (LBSN). The nationality information allows us to replicate the exposure on a
banking group level consistent with the consolidated banking statistics (CBS). To calculate US dollar
positions of non-US banks we aggregate the global dollar-denominated positions of banks of a given
nationality, subtract interoffice positions denominated in US dollars, and add the local positions in
local currency of banks of the same nationality vis-à-vis the United States from the CBS. This last
addition is necessary to capture the US dollar-denominated position of foreign banks’ offices in the
US, which are not recorded in the LBSN. To capture the entire dollar liabilities, including (net) off-
balance sheet borrowing, we use data on US dollar-denominated assets to proxy the liabilities (Borio
et al. (2017)). As prudent risk management by banks as well as supervisory requirements in many
jurisdictions dictate that currency mismatches are to be kept at a minimum, foreign currency liabil-
ities closely match assets in the same currency. While foreign currency denominated assets should
be fully funded by foreign currency denominated liabilities, risk management and supervision does
not restrict the opposite case when foreign currency denominated liabilities exceed foreign currency
denominated assets. To the extent that this opposite case applies — if anything — we underestimate
the stock of liabilities denominated in US dollars. As long as any approximation error applies uni-
formly to all lending banking systems, it does not affect the dollar dependence computed for a single
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lending banking system, because the dollar dependence is computed as a ratio of a lending banking
system’s US dollar-denominated assets— as proxy for US dollar-denominated liabilities— to the total
of lending banking systems’ dollar-denominated assets — as proxy for total US dollar-denominated
liabilities.
7.3 Computation of market shares
To define the market shares we argue that a lending banking systems’ share in a borrowing
country’s market for foreign credit, i.e. credit provided by all foreign lending banking systems, is a
more appropriate choice than the share in the market for total credit, i.e. foreign credit plus domestic
credit provided by borrowing country banks. In this paper, our focus is on the effect of the foreign
credit supply from lending banking systems induced by fluctuations in US dollar funding conditions.
To isolate the effect of foreign as opposed to domestic credit on house price growth, our identification
strategy in equation (13) employs country-time fixed effects that eliminate borrowing country specific
economic and financial market developments, including the growth in domestic credit provided by
borrowing country banks independent from the funding obtained through foreign borrowing. This
allows us to abstract from domestic credit conditions, and to work with market shares based on for-
eign credit. Besides, taking into account domestic credit would merely scale down lending bank-
ing systems’ market shares. However, the cross-sectional distribution over lending banking systems
would stand largely unaffected by this scaling, because e.g. G6 lending banking systems have a large
market share in every borrowing country, regardless of whether the share is computed in terms of
foreign or total credit. Moreover, potential shifts in the cross-sectional distribution of the market
shares due to scaling are negligible as the market shares only serve as weights in borrowing countries’
dollar dependence as defined in equation (4). More relevant to the identification strategy than the
question of whether to define market shares in terms of foreign or total credit is the lending banking
systems’ heterogenous exposure to US dollar funding shifts as measured by λbt .
7.4 Locational versus consolidated banking statistics
The computation of the market shares is based on lending banking systems’ foreign claims
from the CBS on immediate counterparty basis, as opposed to the locational banking statistics (LBS).
A practical reason for using the CBS is the availability of bilateral lending data, i.e. from a banking
system of given nationality to a borrower country, for the entire time period of our sample. This data
has only started to be available in the LBS since 2012Q1 — a time period too short to analyze house
price cycles. In addition to the availability of bilateral data, there are three economic reasons for using
the CBS.
First, the nationality of the lending bank coincides with the decision making unit of the bank
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(Takáts and Temesvary (2016)). This is particularly relevant for global banks at the core of our analysis
since decisions on leverage and foreign currency funding— such as from the US dollar moneymarket
— are taken at a bank’s global headquarters. Consequently, a global bank’s lending — including the
lending by foreign offices in the borrowing country — is driven by factors better captured by nation-
ality. Therefore, a borrowing country’s exposure vis-a-vis the global bank’s lending should also be
measured based on consolidated claims.
Second, the CBS exclude interoffice positions by construction. Consider a British bank that
extends a loan to a borrower in Chile. The exposure between the Chilean borrower and the British
bank does not include any intermediate interoffice transactions, such as for instance between the
British bank and its subsidiary in Mexico and from the Mexican subsidiary to the borrower in Chile.
By virtue of consolidation, the CBS records only an exposure of the British bank vis-à-vis a borrower
in Chile. This logic also applies to “looking through” financial centers through which a significant
share of international transactions are routed. Suppose a German bank lends to a borrower in Finland
through its German subsidiary in Luxemburg. The LBS would count two cross-border transactions,
from the German bank to its subsidiary in Luxemburg and from the subsidiary to the borrower in
Finland. The CBS, however, establish a direct link between the German bank and its borrower in
Finland.
Third, the CBS take into account the two principal transaction forms of foreign credit provi-
sion. Foreign banks can provide credit either cross-border or through a local office in the borrowing
country. As discussed by Kerl and Niepmann (2015), the choice depends on the “efficiencies of coun-
tries’ banking sectors, differences in the return on loans across countries, and impediments to foreign
bank operations”. As the consolidated view does not differentiate between these two channels, it ac-
counts for the entirety of foreign claims.
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Table A.1:
Summary statistics and data sources
Variable Unit Definition Source Notes N mean sd min max
Dependent variables
house price growth %
growth rate of the real residential country-
level house price index over four quarters 
ahead
OECD
The types of dwellings 
entering in the price index 
for each country might 
differ across countries.
1395 2.17 7.78 -28.73 55.44
house price growth 
synchronization
product of the growth rates of the real 
residential country-level house price indeces 
of borrowing countries i and j, over four 
OECD 28,360 13.06 63.44 -592.71 3243.75
mortgage credit growth %
growth rate of country-level mortgage 
credit over four quarters ahead
credit to households and non-profit institutions 
serving households from the long series on total 
credit and domestic bank credit to the private 
non-financial sector, Bank for International 
Settlements
 1,437 60.90 11.26 -17.57 105
mortgage credit growth 
synchronization
product of the growth rates of country-
level mortgage credit in borrowing 
countries i and j, over four quarters ahead
credit to households and non-profit institutions 
serving households from the long series on total 
credit and domestic bank credit to the private 
non-financial sector, Bank for International 
Settlements
31,388  36.7 172.70 -3333.33 8647.06
bilateral lending from lending 
banking system b to borrowing 
country i
%
growth rate in bilateral international 
claims of lending banking system b on 
borrowing country i over four quarters 
ahead
consolidated banking statistics, Bank for 
International Settlements
We remove all 
observations with 
bilateral foreign credit 
below 10 million US 
dollars, and winsorize 
below the 1st and above 
the 99th percentile.
17,021 8.27 35.15 -86.20 1176.98
aggregate lending of borrowing 
country b in US dollars
%
growth rate in aggregate foreign claims of 
lending banking system b in US dollars 
over four quarters ahead
locational banking statistics by nationality, 
Bank for International Settlements
2,632 10.52 1463.68 -95.74 39317.95
aggregate lending of borrowing 
country b in all other currencies
%
growth rate in aggregate foreign claims of 
lending banking system b in all other 
currencies over four quarters ahead
locational banking statistics by nationality, 
Bank for International Settlements
2,019 32.13 605.59 -2678.45 19523.52
Explanatory variables
dollar dependence of lending 
banking system
%
fraction of global US dollar-denominated 
bank borrowing accounted for by banks 
headquartered in the respective lending 
banking system
locational banking statistics by nationality, 
Bank for International Settlements
2,160 3.16 5.16 0 24.03
dollar dependence of borrowing 
country
%
products of lending banking systems' 
market shares in foreign credit provision to 
country i and the lending banking systems' 
dollar dependence, summed over banks 
headquartered in lending banking systems 
b that lend to country i
consolidated banking statistics and locational 
banking statistics by nationality, Bank for 
International Settlements
2232 7.13 2.78 0.91 15.66
dollar co-dependence
product of dollar dependence of borrowing 
countries i and country j
consolidated banking statistics and locational 
banking statistics by nationality, Bank for 
International Settlements
 40,626 53.30 30.73 0 199.25
co-Herfindahl
product of lending banking systems' 
market shares in foreign credit provision to 
borrowing countries i and j, summed over 
banks headquartered in lending banking 
systems b that lend to country i
consolidated banking statistics, Bank for 
International Settlements
40626 690.36 444.05 0 3601.08
Drivers of US dollar funding conditions
US net capital inflows scaled by 
total US banking equity
%
US net capital inflows scaled by total US 
banking equity
US net capital inflows: net US incurrance of 
liabilities excluding financial derivatives (net 
increase in liabilities / financial inflow (+)) 
minus net US acquisition of financial assets 
excluding financial derivatives (net increase in 
assets / financial outflow (+)): US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, international transaction 
statistics; scaling factor: total US commercial 
banking equity: total equity capital for 
commercial banks in the US [USTEQC]: Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council 
(US), retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis
 1,620 0.15 0.082 0.33 0.0043
US net capital inflows scaled by 
total US dollar-denominated 
assets
%
US net capital inflows scaled by total US 
dollar denominated assets
US net capital inflows: net US incurrance of 
liabilities excluding financial derivatives (net 
increase in liabilities / financial inflow (+)): US 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, international 
transaction statistics; scaling factor: total US 
dollar denominated assets: locational banking 
statistics by nationality, Bank for International 
Settlements
 1,620 0.013 0.0072 0.00044 0.026
 1,620 1.48 2.19 -1.7 5.35
Federal funds rate % Wu-Xia shadow federal funds rate Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Broker-dealer leverage %
total financial assets of broker-dealers over 
equity of boker-dealers
US Flow of Funds, table L.128, Federal Reserve 
Board, retrieved through EconStats
 1,620 4928 2030 3069 15841
VIX index SP500 Volatility Index Chicago Board Options Exchange  1,620 21.13 9.14 11.03 58.60
Broad dollar index index
trade weighted real effective exchange rate 
based on 26 bilateral exchange rates as 
selected by the Federal Reserve Board
Federal Reserve Board, retrieved from FRED, 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
 1,620 108.41 9.33 95.23 129.15
Controls
bilateral trade integration %
sum of bilateral imports of country i and j 
as ratio of the sum of nominal GDPs of 
country i and j
imports: Direction of Trade Statistics, 
International Monetary Fund; nominal GDP: 
International Financial Statistics, International 
Monetary Fund
31653 0.00014 0.01 2.82E-13 1.68
Note: This table shows the definitions, data sources and summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis for the
period 2000Q1-2015Q1.
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